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PRIVACY AND FREEDOM. By Alan F. Westin. New York: Athe-
neum. 1967. Pp. xvi, 487. $10. 
Westin's book is more, thankfully, than just an inventory of the 
exotic hardware of present and future snooping, for as the writer 
of the book's foreword points out, "the need .•. to sound the tocsin 
in simplistic terms of alarm [is] thoroughly removed" (p. xi). The 
inventory is there and does make interesting reading, but most of 
the technical data has appeared elsewhere and even the newest tech-
nology is scarcely shocking in times such as ours. There will, how-
ever, be some surprises for most readers. For example, this reviewer 
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was familiar with parabolic microphones that can pick up ordinary 
conversations at 500 feet but was unaware of a new device that can 
be focused on a windowpane over a mile away and monitor con-
versations behind the window by measuring the vibrations of the 
glass. Similarly, while I was aware that current computer science 
makes a national data bank a potential reality, I did not know that 
by utilizing the laser principle it soon may be possible to keep com-
plete birth-to-death dossiers for every citizen on 100 reels of tape, 
nor was I aware that there is a polygraph that can be disguised as 
an ordinary chair and thus used without the subject's knowledge.1 
Nevertheless "the problems for privacy are at the present time not 
significantly posed by esoteric new discoveries. Rather, they are 
raised most sharply by the familiar and increasingly pervasive items: 
the miniature, battery-powered microphone, the extension tele-
phone, the portable (and concealable) tape recorder, and the small, 
high resolution camera" (p. xi). 
I. ATTITUDES ON PRIVACY 
On a television panel some time ago a police official and a civil 
liberties spokesman were debating the propriety of legalized taps on 
public telephones in light of the fact that such tapping necessarily 
results in the monitoring of conversations between persons not even 
remotely connected with suspected criminal activity. The libertarian 
asked if he should not be justifiably offended if a police tapper were 
to be discovered eavesdropping on a telephone conversation between 
him and his wife. The officer replied that from his point of view 
if he were not discussing anything illegal, he would not mind in 
the least. Whereupon, the libertarian lamented that his values were 
so far separated from those of the officer that a meaningful debate 
was impossible. The policeman's attitude, however, is not at all 
unique. With the proliferation of polygraph use, not only against 
suspected criminals, but for such noncompelling purposes as deter-
mination of an employee's secret attitude toward his boss or a 
viewer's "real" reaction to a proposed television series, it has been 
all but forgotten that Pope Pius XII flatly condemned the poly-
graph (even when used to detect crime) as a morally unjustifiable 
invasion of the individual's "inner domain" (p. 238). 
Although Westin does fear that many people are dangerously 
indifferent to growing encroachments on privacy, he finds some 
ground for optimism in what he detects to be an emerging con-
1. As might be expected, this device is generally conceded to be even less reliable 
than the traditional polygraph (p. 213). Polygraphs, psychological tests, and the data 
bank are part of a paradoxical undercurrent of the privacy problem; in many cases 
the threat is not so much from the possibility that these devices will expose the 
individual's secrets as it is from the probability that erroneous information about the 
individual will be developed and disseminated. 
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sensus on a "minimum position" in support of privacy that spans 
the entire political-ideological spectrum (p. 367). The best example 
which he offers in support of this observation is the case of psycho-
logical testing. The Right suspects that such tests are drawn up by 
people who consider rightist positions pathological. The Left 
thinks that the tests are designed to weed out eccentrics and to 
produce conformity. Even the Center fears that their own hidden 
unorthodoxies may be exposed. In fact, the tests seem to be de-
fended only by that certain type of social psychologist who is capable 
of constructing a distinction between judging the reasonableness 
of a person's religious belief (which we are constitutionally com-
mitted not to do) and judging the same person's "mental health" 
as evidenced by his religious belief (p. 269). As a result, use of the 
tests in both the public and private sectors has been noticeably cur• 
tailed over the past few years. 
The element of selective "ox-goring" in these positions must not 
be overlooked, however. The coalition against psychological testing 
is based, in part, on an uncertainty as to whom the testers are out 
"to get." If, for example, the tests were more reliable and the Right 
were firmly in control, one wonders if they would object to tests 
effectively designed to screen out those (and only those) with leftist 
tendencies. This same self-serving element is even clearer in the 
areas that Westin designates as "physical" and "data" surveillance.2 
Conservatives are quite concerned about electronic eavesdropping 
when it is used by the Internal Revenue Service, but approve of it 
in cases involving "national security," that is, snooping on left-wing 
individuals and groups. Right-wing groups are generally opposed to 
gun registration and to a national data bank, again because they see 
the federal government and the social scientists who would have 
access to the information as being "liberal." As a law professor, on 
the other hand, I am perpetually outraged by the incredible amount 
of snooping into the personal affairs of law students that is done by 
conservatively-oriented boards of bar examiners. It may be that work-
able political coalitions can be evolved in support of some "neutral 
principles" of privacy on the basis of common need and the desire 
of all people to keep some things to themselves-certainly we must 
hope for such a development-but Westin's own accounts of past 
2. Westin divides surveillance into three general categories: 
physical surveillance, the observation through optical or accoustical devices of a 
person's location, acts, speech or private writing without his knowledge or against 
his will .•• psychological surveillance, the use of oral or written tests, devices, or 
substances to extract from an individual infonnation that he does not give willingly, 
or does not know that he is revealing, or reveals without a mature awareness of 
its significance for his private personality • • • data surveillance, the collection, 
exchange and manipulation of documentary information about individuals and 
groups by data-processing machines (primarily computers). [P. 68, emphasis 
added.] 
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legislative attempts to control surveillance are certainly far from 
consoling. 
Although Westin's treatment of the subject matter is comprehen-
sive, there is an important aspect of the threat to privacy which he 
slights: the motives behind surveillance. They are, as they have always 
been, societal protection, personal gain, and curiosity. Westin seems 
to posit these motives as being fairly constant, changing only in rela-
tive degree of importance. Instant espionage and counter-espionage 
may seem a more pressing need since instant annihilation has be-
come a possibility. Today there are more trade secrets to be kept and 
to be stolen. More aspects of curiosity have been legitimatized in 
the eyes of some behavioral scientists. By and large, however, Westin 
seems to see the increased threat to privacy as a function of a rather 
constant desire to snoop plus a greatly advanced and advancing 
technology of surveillance (pp. 52-63). Consideration of current in-
formed speculation by a variety of physical and social scientists and 
others on possible technical, political, and social trends in the last 
third of our century may help add another dimension to the ques-
tion.3 Some of these writers see surveillance and control of individual 
behavior increasing over the next thirty-two years to truly alarming 
proportions, but in their view the availability of advanced surveil-
lance technology will only be an incidental factor. The crucial 
variables lie, they suggest, in other technical and social changes. 
Society will become dependent on an increasingly interrelated tech-
nology, vulnerable to sabotage at innumerable points. Weapons of 
great destructive capacity (even nuclear) will be miniaturized and 
available to private groups and individuals. The demise of the work 
ethic, the waning of the nation-state, and the failure of traditional 
icons with a resultant groping for new life values (already evidenced 
by the "hippie" and "New Left" phenomena)4 may lead to a sort 
of "antipatriotism" and general trend toward anarchism. I£ these 
predictions prove true to any substantial degree, it is difficult to 
envision a workable political coalition in support of privacy emerg-
ing from our current political and social establishments. Instead, we 
might expect the rise of a technological elite who will insist on using 
surveillance technology to control the "antitechnocrats." Perhaps 
law could rebuild the walls that technology has "dissolved."5 Behind 
law, however, is politics and in this area "politics as usual" offers 
as much to fear as to comfort. 
3. See H. KAHN &: A. WEINER, THE YEAR 2000: A FRAMEWORK FOR SPECULATION 
(1967); Toward the Year 2000: Work in Progress, DAEDALUS, J. AMER. ACAD. ARTS &: 
SCIENCE 639-988 (1967). See also H. M. McLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA: THE Ex.TEN-
TIONS OF MAN (1964). 
4. See Laughlin, LSD-25 and the Other Hallucinogens: A Pre-Reform Proposal, 
!l6 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 23, 29-39 (1967). 
5. Chapter eight of Privacy and Freedom is entitled "Dissolving the Walls and 
Windows." 
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II. LEGAL MEASURES To PROTECT PRIVACY 
Westin devotes a great deal of thought to the detailed policy 
decisions involved in the many types of legal controls that could be 
imposed (given a willing legislature) on many of the potential sources 
of privacy invasions. For example, he opposes (quite correctly, I 
believe) the present Supreme Court position on "one party" eaves-
dropping and recommends that future statutes consider such eaves-
dropping to be a "search" requiring legal controls (p. 390).6 He also 
discusses the mechanics of "locking" computers, requiring two or 
three officials acting simultaneously to open certain memory banks 
(a technique used to control the firing of nuclear weapons). The 
constantly recurring weakness of these approaches, however, is the 
necessity to repose trust in a fairly large group of officials. Westin 
frequently refers to the release of information being "limited" to 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency, 
the Defense Department, or some other agency (pp. 324-25, 376, 
390-91). Such suggestions are disquietingly close to the assurances 
that we often hear from those engaged in snooping: that the infor-
mation will only be used by "authorized" persons, as if that were 
equivalent to the confidentiality of the confessional. 
Westin's suggestions for increasi~g the available legal sanctions 
against privacy breachers appear more promising. For example, he 
suggests that information about an individual could be treated as 
that individual's property, thus giving him access to all the criminal 
and civil remedies for misappropriation or other misuses of such 
"property." As Westin himself notes, however, this approach to 
protection of privacy could create serious questions concerning free 
speech and press. A most provocative idea is that a contractual obli-
gation be implied against landlords and innkeepers to prevent them 
from cooperating in an invasion of the privacy of tenants. This 
would indeed strike at a pervasive method of eavesdropping. 
Westin, then, sees new surveillance technology as having "dis-
solved the walls," allowing the traditional impetuses for surveillance 
to cause serious encroachments on privacy. Cautiously optimistic, he 
nevertheless sees a consensus emerging on a "minimum position" in 
6. The Supreme Court has upheld the use of evidence of a conversation surrepti-
tiously taped or transmitted by one party to the conversation, or monitored on a 
telephone line with the consent of one such party. The rationale behind such ad-
missibility is that since a speaker traditionally runs the risk that a party present or 
addressed may testify to the conversation in court, he should not be heard to object 
to the verification of that testimony by a tape or third party. Osborn v. United States, 
385 U.S. 323 (1966) (taped); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963) (taped); Rath-
bum v. United States, 355 U.S. 107 (1957) (monitored on an extension telephone); On 
Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952) (transmitted). As Westin points out, "This 
has been the basic charter for private-detective taps and bugs, for 'owner' eaves-
dropping on facilities that are used by members of the public, and for much free-lance 
police eavesdropping'' (p. 390). 
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support of privacy.7 Although recognizing that delicate policy de-
cisions and carefully designed techniques will be required, he 
believes this consensus can effectively exert itself through public and 
private channels to restore the balance between privacy and neces-
sary surveillance. A more pessimistic prognosis might see a con-
tinuation of the current legislative deadlock brought on by the 
unwillingness of a majority to agree on a common distinction be-
tween "my privacy" and society's need to know about "your be-
havior and attitudes." Simultaneously, there could emerge a tech-
nological elite, using surveillance to an ever-increasing degree to 
control an anomic, "anti-patriotic" populace. Meanwhile, any legal 
controls that happen to emerge from legislatures or courts might 
be seriously compromised by unsympathetic public officials.8 
III. PERSONAL STRATEGIES AGAINST INVASIONS OF PRIVACY 
If the pessimistic view is at all plausible, it would seem wise to 
consider personal strategies to combat encroachments on privacy.9 
Privacy, as Westin demonstrates, has both personal and social func-
tions. On the personal level, he sees a need for privacy in order to 
maintain mental stability, to facilitate intimate relationships, and 
to encourage creativity. These assumptions are based upon an im-
plicit observation that in our society (and perhaps most societies) 
nonconformity, when discovered, will result in legal, economic or 
social sanctions. On the social or practical level, privacy is needed to 
preserve the confidentiality of business, military, and political tech-
niques and strategies, as well as to facilitate negotiation. Negotiation 
(on all levels from international relations to collective bargaining) 
may be hamstrung if the negotiators' constituents are aware of every 
exploratory probe. 
One strategy that can be implemented to protect privacy on 
the social or practical level is the use of counter-surveillance mea-
sures. These range from measures as elaborate as specially constructed 
security rooms, electronic "sweeps" for eavesdropping equipment, 
and laser-beam communications to measures as simple as the writing 
of key words and phrases on slips of paper (passing them in a manner 
to conceal them from hidden cameras) when one suspects that a 
conversation is being monitored. While such measures may be suffi-
7. He candidly admits that "some might read the record differently .•. " (p. 367). 
8. The Justice Department, the F.B.I., and most state and local police agencies 
consistently ignore the clear holding of the Supreme Court in Nardone v. United 
States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937), that § 605 of the Federal Communications Act of 1934 [47 
U.S.C. § 605 (1964)), prohibiting interception and divulgence of any communication 
(except where authorized by the sender), applies to state and federal officers. Not only 
has the Justice Department refused to abide by the Act as construed, it has said that 
it cannot "in good conscience" prosecute state officials under it (pp. 174-79). 
9. "I'd face it as a wise man would, And train for ill and not for good." A. E. 
HoumAN, A SHROPSHIRE LAD 108 (1896). 
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cient for the protection of "practical privacy," which is normally 
needed only sporadically and at times when the parties are con-
sciously aware that deliberate protection of privacy is advisable, they 
are hardly adequate for the protection of personal privacy. In the 
personal sphere, being constantly on guard against surveillance 
would be self-defeating. The object of surveillance is often to deter 
rather than detect certain types of conduct, such as where closed-
circuit television is installed in industrial plants to prevent employee 
pilfering and malingering. Fortunately, constant surveillance of a 
very large portion of the population is impractical since it would 
require better than a one-to-one ratio of surveillancers to surveil-
lancees. Even if technology were available to tape and film most 
of the activities of every citizen, someone would still have to review 
the tapes and films. If the day arrives when computers are able to 
perform this evaluation, the Big Brother state in its pristine form 
will be possible.10 In the meantime, the threat of spot checks may 
nevertheless be enough to destroy the personal functions of privacy. 
For psychic damage, the possibility that we may be under surveil-
lance is sufficiently disruptive. 
The right of privacy, of course, is not designed to facilitate 
criminal conduct (at least not serious criminal conduct). The re-
luctance with which the exclusionary rule was elevated to a constitu-
tional status is proof enough of that.11 The most important area 
where privacy and surveillance collide involves what Westin calls 
"permissible deviation." Such behavior consists of actions that are 
not illegal (or at least not usually prosecuted)12 but the disclosure of 
which would likely subject the actor to economic or social sanctions. 
I would like to suggest tentatively that a serious counterstrategy 
might be temporarily to ignore invasions of privacy in such cases. 
I do not mean to say that we should tolerate the voyeuristic police-
man who bugs the marital bedroom. I do mean to say that perhaps 
we should eschew those social or economic opportunities that may 
hinge upon whether or not everything we do is entirely conven-
tional. 
If we may return for a moment to practical privacy, Westin dis-
10. Automated evaluation is possible to a very limited degree today, as where 
devices are installed on production machines to evaluate the operator's perfonnance. 
Westin suggests that use of devices which react to certain sounds may soon make it 
possible for computers to sort out conversations in which particular words are used 
(p. 87). 
11. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). 
12. These enforcement-free violations would presumably include such things as 
gambling with friends in the home and proscribed sexual conduct between marriage 
partners. Westin suggests that one of the legitimate functions of privacy is that it 
permits the state to ignore inconsequential offenses without bringing disrespect upon 
itself. This seems to overlook the fact that these laws are occasionally enforced for 
political reasons, blackmail, or personal malice. A much more direct approach would 
be to remove these "morality" crimes from the statute books. 
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misses quite summarily our Wilsonian rhetoric about "open cove-
nants, openly arrived at" as patently impractical. Perhaps he is right. 
But I was disappointed that he did not consider more thoroughly the 
ramifications of the quite valid argument that government business 
today is carried on in an atmosphere of too much rather than too 
little secrecy (p. 51).13 The preoccupation with protecting and steal-
ing trade secrets that currently pervades American business should 
also lead us to consider whether a more serious problem might not 
be the diseconomy associated with a system that puts such a high 
premium upon concealing useful knowledge. Similarly, Westin ex-
pressly recognizes that to a large extent our personal vulnerability 
to snooping is a function of "role-playing" and the resultant need 
for periods of privacy during which we can release a bit more of our 
true selves (pp. 34-37). Yet he has virtually nothing to say about 
whether we could reduce the amount of psychological "role-playing" 
in our everyday lives--an important question which preoccupies 
a significant portion of our population today.14 
Our affluent society offers the individual an extraordinary degree 
of choice in this regard. If one decides that he will forego that type 
13. 'Westin quotes Adam Yarmolinski on the importance of government secrecy in 
international crises (such as the Cuban missile affair) to facilitate the delicate process 
of "signaling" intentions to foreign powers. "Signaling" is one of those terms currently 
tossed around by diplomats that are unsettling to me; somehow I wish that the world's 
leaders could communicate more explicitly when the threat of nuclear holocaust is 
high. 
14. See, e.g., E. BERNE, GAMES PEOPLE PLAY (1964); N. BROWN, LIFE AGAINST DEATH 
(1959); A. CAMUS, THE REBEL (1954); S. FREUD, CIVILIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 
(1930); E. FROMM, BEYOND THE CHAINS OF ILLUSION (1962); J.-P. SARTRE, SAINT GENET 
(1952); A. WATIS, PSYCHOTHERAPY EAST AND WEST (1961). See also Laughlin, supra note 
4. To the limited degree 'Westin does discuss this aspect of the problem, he seems to 
assume that a sharp division between public posture and private thoughts and be-
havior is a sine qua non of social organization: 
The greatest threat to civilized social life would be a situation in which each 
individual was utterly candid in his communications with others, saying exactly 
what he knew and felt at all times. The havoc done to interpersonal relations by 
children, saints, mental patients and adult 'innocents' is legendary. fP. 37.] 
Yet there is an abundance of psychological opinion today to the effect that inter-
personal relations are suffering more from a lack of candor than from an abundance 
of it. 
In a similar vein Westin seemingly merges two uses of the term "role-playing"; 
sociological role-playing (that we must all serve as lawyers, teachers, students, etc.) 
and psychological role-playing (masking one's true feelings). "On any given day a man 
may move through the roles of stem father, loving husband, car-pool comedian, skilled 
lathe operator, union steward, watercooler flirt, and American Legion committee chair-
man ... " all of which are, according to Westin, "roles that life demands" (pp. 34-35). 
Of course, life does not demand that one be a water-cooler flirt or an American Legion 
committee chairman unless one is so inclined. Note that no adjective of affectation 
is attached to the social roles of "skilled lathe operator" or "union steward." Being a 
comedian is not usually required to gain admittance to a car pool and forced attempts 
at comedy will generally be unappreciated by fellow riders. Finally, a husband will 
be "loving'' in a meaningful sense only if he feels love for his wife and his attitude 
toward his children should, according to most current theories, be as emotionally 
honest as possible. 
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of employment, social position, or political influence that requires 
him to hide too much of his true nature, the odds are still good that 
he will not starve. Perhaps by his example such conduct will tend to 
lose its status as a condition precedent to economic, social, and 
political advantage. In any event, the adoption of such an attitude 
has its own rewards. A little over a year ago a group of "New Left" 
youths set the formidable House Un-American Activities Committee 
to rout.15 These witnesses openly defied inquisitors who, in earlier 
days, had terrorized the high and the mighty. The surprising result 
of their audacious behavior was a general condemnation of the 
Committee itself, even by conservative political figures.16 Watching 
this apparent paper tiger being tormented, one wondered how it had 
for so many years pilloried the powerful and influential. The 
answer, in part, is that those earlier witnesses' very vulnerability lay 
in their conception of their own power and influence. For political 
or economic reasons, they thought it necessary to keep intact an 
impeccably strong anti-communist image, and any implications to 
the contrary which the Committee could create were feared as 
momentous embarrassments. The new witnesses were not concerned 
with their images and while most of us would agree that at least some 
of them went far beyond the bounds of propriety, we nevertheless 
should wonder whether they did not hit upon something that earlier 
witnesses had overlooked. 
By this point a number of quite cogent questions will no doubt 
have occurred to the reader. It may be suggested that these young 
witnesses have condemned themselves to lives of political and eco-
nomic ineffectiveness, but it remains to be seen whether they are 
better or worse than the more timid witnesses of the fifties, and in 
any event, it must be remembered that the witnesses voluntarily 
accepted that risk. Next it might be argued that the Committee is 
checked by an infrastructure of liberty preserved, in part at least, by 
those same types of liberals of the fifties who struggled to hold on 
15. The hearings opened on August 15, 1966 in defiance of a federal court injunc-
tion (dissolved on appeal) for the asserted purpose of considering a bill introduced 
by Representative Joe Pool of Texas, the acting committee chairman. The second day 
of the hearings was marked by the forcible ejection from the hearing room of a 
witness' attorney and the subsequent withdrawal of seven other attorneys and two 
witnesses in protest over the incident. 34 CONG. Q. 1843-45 (1966); N.Y. Times, Aug. 
17, 1966, at 1, col. 1, 24, cols. 1-4. Ten hostile witnesses did remain to testify during 
the tumultuous hearings that continued through the nineteenth. They were described 
by the New York Times as "[y]ouths of the New Left, seemingly unafraid of contempt 
convictions •••• " N.Y. Times, Aug. 19, 1966, at 1, col. 5. As the Times noted, "[t]he 
pattern in the past had been for accused communists to invoke their constitutional 
right against self-incrimination and refuse to answer questions about their beliefs and 
affiliations. The ten youths of the New Left who appeared this week used the hearings 
as their first national forum to express their views." N.Y. Times, Aug. 20, 1966, at 1, 
col. 7. No contempt citations followed. 
16. Senator Dirksen said, "[t]his spectacle can do the Congress no good." 34 CONG. 
Q. 1844 (1966). 
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to their reputations and hence political effectiveness. It may be 
further argued that such passive aggression and naive innocence as 
the "New Left" witnesses displayed will play into the hands of 
potential Big Brothers or more traditional fascistic elements. 
Clearly, if the Committee had summary powers to imprison or 
execute these witnesses and the will to do so, their openness would 
have done them precious little good. In such a case, however, secre-
tiveness would have probably done them little better. All nonviolent 
(in the broadest sense) political and social strategies17 depend in 
some degree on the existence of human conscience and self-restraint 
(even where it is established by a balance of power). When conscience 
and restraint are absent in the rulers, the only alternatives are sub-
mission on the one hand or violent resistance on the other. The ques-
tion of which strategies will be most effective in preserving and 
strengthening that conscience and restraint is thus one of the utmost 
importance. I would like to suggest the strategy of openness; totali-
tarians operate best in secrecy while liberty flourishes in the sunlight. 
Marshall McLuhan views the world as irrevocably transformed 
into a global village by the electronic age,18 and, as in any village, we 
are inextricably involved in the lives of the other villagers. If that 
be so, it still need not necessarily be a requiem for privacy. Such a 
condition could in fact foster voluntary abstention from invasions of 
privacy. The urban phenomena that newspapers regard, perhaps too 
simply, as a callous lack of concern for others may in fact be a grop-
ing in the direction of establishing an interpersonal balance between 
the need to show an interest in others and the need to respect their 
privacy. As the opportunity for observation increases, the drive of 
voyeurism diminishes. Topless night clubs would hardly prosper in 
a society where bosoms are customarily not covered. If 1984 were to 
come about, monitoring Big Brother's television eyes would, in a 
very short while, become an exceedingly dull job. The point is that 
in anything approaching a democratic, free society with an advanced 
surveillance technology one's vulnerability to snooping bears a 
direct ratio to the number of items that the society (and the indi-
vidual) deems damaging. If a significant number of talented people 
in a society refused to submit to offensive psychological job tests and 
refused to worry about ultra-paranoid security checks, the resulting 
"brain drain" might bring about a revision of these practices. It 
would require many cooperating technicians to run Big Brother's 
society. Perhaps, then, the best way to begin revising society's atti-
tude is by revising one's own. In fact, this personal re-evaluation 
17. "Non-violent political strategies" is used here to mean all political strategies 
that do not openly involve force or violence. The term is not limited here to that 
special type of political action that relies heavily on picketing, public demonstrations, 
or passive civil disobedience. 
18. H. M. McLUHAN, supra note !!. 
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might already be taking place. It may well be that those who try 
this course will become a hopeless minority of martyrs, but if that 
be so, I doubt that any federal or state statute or court decision will 
provide effective protection for privacy. It seems appropriate here to 
paraphrase Learned Hand's famous statement: 
In a society so riven with voyeurism and intolerance that the spirit 
of openness is gone, no law can save the right of privacy. In a 
society where openness and tolerance flourish, very little legal pro-
tection will be needed. In a society that evades its responsibility by 
relying solely on the law for protection of the right of privacy, that 
right in the end will perish.10 
IV. EPILOGUE 
I do not mean to suggest that all of the problems posed by elec-
tronic eavesdropping and other modern incursions on privacy can 
be obviated by throwing down one's guard and acting as if one were 
oblivious to the threat. Under certain circumstances such a course 
of action would amount to no more than a docile walk of sheep to 
slaughter. If one were to find oneself in the position of, say, the 
political or ethnic enemies of Hitler, the best strategy might be total 
secrecy, concealed identity, and covert armed resistance.20 
19. The original quotation is: "[T)his much I think I do know-that a society so 
riven that the spirit of moderation is gone, no court can save; that a society where 
that spirit flourishes, no court need save; that in a society which evades its responsi-
bility by thrusting upon the courts the nurture of that spirit, that spirit in the end will 
perish." L. HAND, The Contributions of an Independent Judiciary in THE SPlRIT OF 
LIBERTY 181 (Dilliard ed. 1952). Concededly, the reviewer has somewhat modified the 
intent as well as the application of Hand's epigram. Hand was positing the alternative 
of the society expressing itself through legislative bodies; I am questioning even the 
efficacy of statutory laws in this particular area. There is, of course, the strong possi-
bility that no such statutes would be enacted in a society riven with voyeurism and 
intolerance. 
20. In Eichman in Jerusalem, however, Hannah Arendht discusses a popular ra-
tionalization of Germans who knew about the extermination of Jews but failed to act. 
Acting meant certain death. These Germans say they would have paid that price if it 
would have accomplished anything, but they point out that the Nazis carefully avoided 
allowing resistors to become public martyrs; such people just quietly disappeared. Yet 
Arendht asserts that the stories of those few Germans who did rebel against the 
genocide program generally filtered out, as it epitomized by the case of Anton Schmidt, 
a German sargeant executed for aiding Jews, who is a folk hero in Israel today. 
H • .ARENDHT, EICHMAN IN JERUSALEM 210-12 (1953). One great irony of the "final solution 
to the Jewish problem" is that while it was central to Nazi theory, it was carried out 
in extreme secrecy. E. NOLTE, THE THREE FACES OF FASCISM (1965). This was not merely 
dictated by world opinion (which Nazis generally flouted) but also involved im-
portant domestic considerations. Under Nazi theory virtually every ethnic, political, 
and nationality group the world over was seen as an enemy of the Reich-yet the Reich 
was to endure for a thousand years. This paradox was explained by blaming the Jews 
for turning the world against the Nazis. If that were so, exile would only exacerbate 
the problem and genocide was the only solution. Yet only the most fanatic of the 
Nazis could carry their beliefs to this logical conclusion. Public disclosure of the 
genocide program would have forced the more "decent" Nazis to face up to the 
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What I do wish to point up is that it is impractical to isolate one 
aspect of the unprecedented social and technological revolution 
in which we are now living and try to deal with it as if other aspects 
of modern life were virtually static.21 The current crisis in privacy 
seems to me to be a result of the fact that we are currently suspended 
somewhere between McLuhan's electronic village and a Victorian 
attitude that sees the value of privacy chiefly in terms of an oppor-
tunity to release emotions bottled up for the sake of public prudery 
and orthodoxy. I am suggesting that we probably cannot put effective 
legal checks on invasions of privacy so long as we draw so many 
sharp distinctions between what is permissible in private and what 
in public, that is, so long as we believe in liberty only insofar as 
its exercise is successfully hidden. In such a climate the advantages to 
be gained by snooping will continue to be too great.22 
Westin carefully marshalls the evidence for his finding of a 
"minimum position" consensus in support of privacy and pains-
takingly formulates the detailed policy decisions involved in a 
maximum program against privacy invasions. Both jobs are well 
done. But the wide gap between the maximum program and the 
"minimum position" coalition that is to support it results in a 
functional flaw in an otherwise splendid effort. 
Stanley K. Laughlin, Jr., 
Associate Professor of Law, 
University of Florida 
inconsistencies of their position. Thus it could be said that lack of free speech and free 
press was the primary factor that allowed the program to succeed, 
21. Obviously, speculation about long-range future trends in a world as volatile 
as ours is a tenuous business, as most of those engaged in the business are the first to 
admit. Kahn and Weiner, for example, call their speculations "surprise-free" predic-
tions. KAHN &: WEINER, supra note 3. Yet they note that this is itself a built-in error, 
for the trends strongly indicate that a number of major surprises will no doubt occur 
in the next thirty-three years although there is by definition no way of taking them 
into account. Still it seems futile today to consider long-range legal reforms without 
such speculation. 
22. It is axiomatic that the effectiveness of a deterrent is closely related to the 
countervailing inducements for the performance of the undesired act. In some areas 
criminal proscriptions may even indirectly increase the inducements. In illicit nar-
cotics traffic, for example, criminal proscription makes an inherently cheap product 
very dear, and thus increases the inducements to those who are willing to run the risk 
of criminal penalties for high profits. The risk can also be minimized by careful 
organization and in some cases by bribing public officials. See generally A. LINDE· 
S~UTH, THE ADDicr AND THE LAw (1965). 
